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Now it is true that the needs of human beings may seem to be
insatiable. But they fall into two classes-those needs which are ab-
solute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our
fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative in the
sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above,
makes us feel superior to, our fellows. . . . [As for] the absolute
needs-a point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we
are all of us aware of, when these needs are satisfied in the sense
that we prefer to devote our further energies to non-economic
purposes.
-John Maynard Keynes'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Young Americans have more education than their predecessors, yet
unemployment and underemployment are critical-and possibly wors-
ening-problems.2 Apple is the one of the most valuable companies in
the world,' but its total number of employees is a tiny fraction of the
number who once worked at the firms that used to hold that title.4
Investments in technology have yielded tremendous efficiencies for
producers and consumers, but unequal results; consider the tremen-
dous impact of the ridesharing service Uber, which unlocks the tre-
mendous potential of underutilized private cars but leads to
increasingly low pay for those who drive them.' These technologies
are helping drive GDP in the United States to record levels, but at the
same time, they may accelerate economic and political inequality, as
"[t]hose who own the robots and the tech[nology] are becoming the
new landlord rentier types" and "[i]t's hard to penetrate beyond the
barrier on education alone."6 Increasingly, economic thinkers have
come to take seriously the possibility that such developments are the
result of moves towards a "post-scarcity" society.'
2. See Derek Thompson, The Economy Is Still Terrible for Young People, THE
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/the-
new-normal-for-young-workers/393560 [https://perma.cc/D4DK-F2U3].
3. Jen Wieczner, Apple Takes Back Title of World's Most Valuable Company,
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2016, 4:25 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/03/apple-facebook-ama
zon-google [https://perma.cc/L549-6NSW] (proclaiming Apple "once again the most
valuable company in the world" after recently being supplanted); see also Paul Krug-
man, Opinion, Profits Without Production, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/06/21/opinion/krugman-profits-without-production.html ("Depending
on the vagaries of its stock price . . . [Apple is] either the highest-valued or second-
highest-valued company in America.").
4. Consider the changing identity of the American company-GM once em-
ployed more than 400,000 Americans; Apple has hardly any employees. See Krugman,
supra note 3.
5. Jack Smith IV, Uber Drivers Are Scrambling to Make Ends Meet After Latest
Fare Cuts, OBSERVER (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://observer.com/2015/02/uber-driv
ers-are-scrambling-to-make-ends-meet-after-latest-fare-cuts [https://perma.cc/CWB3-
UPC5].
6. Izabella Kaminska, Time to Take Basic Income Seriously?, FIN. TIMEs: FT AL-
PHAVILLE (June 17, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/06/17/1536022/
time-to-take-basic-income-seriously [http://web.archive.org/web/20151203235246/http:
//ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/06/17/1536022/time-to-take-basic-income-seriously/] (quot-
ing economist and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman).
7. See Michael Rapoport, NYCC 2015: Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong Ponder




der-the-star-trek-economy/] (describing panel discussion in which economics profes-
sor and former Treasury Department official DeLong notes that "[w]e've actually
come a long way toward a 'post-scarcity' society already"); Izabella Kaminska, Larry
Summers on Forwarding the Doozer Economy, FIN. TIMES: FT ALPHAVILLE (Apr. 17,
2014, 3:34 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/04/17/1832512/larry-summers-on-for
warding-the-doozer-economy [https://web.archive.org/web/20151203235341/http://
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Talk of a post-scarcity society can easily sound like the stuff of sci-
ence fiction,' techno-utopianism, or worse-blithe disregard for the
billions of people on the planet for whom real scarcity of basic needs
is very much an entrenched difficulty of the present.' Nevertheless,
the convergence of a series of technological developments has con-
vinced observers both within and outside law that, at least with re-
spect to some industries, highly developed economies are approaching
a world in which goods may be produced at or near a marginal cost of
zero-and where, increasingly, also fixed or first-unit costs'o are fall-
ing rapidly." To clarify, this is not simply the familiar world of nomi-
nally zero-dollar priced goods, in which users "pay" with, for example,
the yielding of their valuable private information.12 Instead, some ac-
counts observe that for many already near-zero-marginal-cost goods
ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/04/17/1832512/larry-summers-on-forwarding-the-doozer-
economy/] (describing interview by Chrystia Freeland of former Treasury Secretary
and World Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers in which the latter stated that
"there's something more significant going on in the industrialized global economy
than the effects of a banking crisis per se, and that that [']something['] is probably
related to technological abundance").
8. Indeed, science fiction repeatedly presents examples of post- or almost-post-
scarcity societies. See, e.g., Abhimanyu Das & Charlie Jane Anders, Post-Scarcity So-
cieties (That Still Have Scarcity), io9: GiZMODO (Sept. 30, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://
io9.com/post-scarcity-societies-that-still-have-scarcity-1640882232 [https://perma.cc/
A26K-MG7X].
9. Even though a fifty percent reduction in the world's extreme poverty rate
from that of 1990 was accomplished five years prior to the UN Millennial Develop-
ment Goals' target date of 2015, more than 800 million people continue to live in
extreme poverty. See We Can End Poverty: Millennium Development Goals and Be-
yond 2015: Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty & Hunger, UNITED NATIONS, http://
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z8Y9-ZC2L].
10. This Article combines the categories of fixed and first-unit costs as they have
been traditionally understood, in examples such as printing presses and factory equip-
ment. However, it should be noted that, as discussed in this Article, future first-unit
costs such as 3D printers may not be fixed for particular products or categories of
products in the manner that those for printing presses and factory equipment tradi-
tionally have been. See infra Section II.B.
11. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
460 (2015); see also Kyle Langvardt, The Replicator and the First Amendment, 25
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59 (2014) (describing likely First
Amendment challenges to attempts to restrain 3D printing as it advances toward its
"theoretical endpoint ... a machine that, like the 'replicators' of Star Trek, can pro-
duce anything the user asks for out of thin air from a digital blueprint"); JEREMY
RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COL-
LABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM (2014); Deven R. Desai &
Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of
Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014).
12. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 149, 152 (2015) ("[C]ustomers of zero-price products pay for those
products, primarily by exchanging their attention, information, or both."); Alec J.
Burnside, No Such Thing as a Free Search: Antitrust and the Pursuit of Privacy Goals,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (May 2015), http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/books/ab
5e2ca2b45bae232el0996c57017a4a.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBJ6-67WU]; Michal S. Gal
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust
Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (2016); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington,
TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW
traditionally protected by intellectual-property law-such as software,
recorded music, and video entertainment-even high initial fixed pro-
duction costs are falling drastically." These observers suggest that the
combination of the rise of the Internet, the development of collabora-
tive innovation and production, and the advance of 3D printing is
leading to a post-scarcity society. 14 Knowledgeable economists and
business writers take the possibility of an economy "beyond scarcity"
seriously." Simply put, Star Trek's Replicator may be closer to reality
than previously thought. 16
Economists, most notably John Maynard Keynes, recognized this
possibility decades ago. By 1930, Keynes observed that "the economic
problem"-that is, material scarcity-"may be solved, or be at least
within sight of solution, within a hundred years."" Keynes's timing
may be surprisingly accurate; legal scholars, particularly in the field of
intellectual property, have of late recognized the implications of this
possibility.s
While this may seem like naive over-optimism, in fact, commenta-
tors have recognized that even if society attained the potential to build
a post-scarcity economy, social, economic, and political forces exist
that would seek to prevent its realization. Indeed, Keynes himself rec-
ognized this nearly a century ago.' 9 Economists, economic journalists,
and science-fiction writers have all recognized that technology has cre-
ated "something of a self-cannibalising effect for most of the capi-
talfist] system" in which the greater the technology-driven
Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV.
606, 606 (2014) ("Offers of free services abound on the Internet.").
13. See, e.g., Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190348090457651225
0915629460 [http://web.archive.org/web/20160720221543/http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460].
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See, e.g., Izabella Kaminska, The Parable of Water, FIN. TIMES: FT AL-
PHAVILLE (June 7, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2012/06/07/1031561/be
yond-scarcity-the-parable-of-water [https://web.archive.org/web/20151203231324/
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/06/07/1031561/beyond-scarcity-the-parable-of-water/
(starting a twenty-four-part series by the Financial Times's Alphaville Blog, including
a discussion of economist Lawrence Summers's views on the real possibility of the
need for post-scarcity economics).
16. See infra Section II.A.
17. KEYNES, supra note 1, at 321, 326.
18. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,
123 HARv. L. REv. 809, 815 (2010) (observing that a "post-rarity society is already
upon us").
19. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNEs, The General Theory and After, Part : Preparation,
in 13 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 491 (Macmillan Press
1973) ("Economic welfare and social well-being will be increased in the long run by a
policy which tends to make capital goods so abundant, that the reward which can be
gained from owning them falls to so modest a figure as to be no longer a serious
burden on anyone. . . . None of this, however, will happen by itself or of its own
accord. The system is not self-adjusting, and, without purposive direction, it is incapa-
ble of translating our actual poverty into our potential plenty.").
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"abundance[,] the more likely capital itself would be undermined,"
inducing the owners of capital to "protect[ ] their rate of profit by
stalling efficiency ... and by ... monopolisation." 2 0 These writers fear
"artificial scarcity" and worry that "profits increasingly reflect market
power rather than production. "21
Despite classic concerns that call for a competition-law response-
that incumbent firms' privately optimal conduct would harm overall
economic welfare 2 2-American antitrust scholarship has yet to engage
with this development; this Article is the first to advocate for a role
for U.S. antitrust law in the emergence of a post-scarcity economy.2 3
Regrettably, determining the exact likelihood that a broad post-scar-
city economy will emerge is beyond the scope of this Article. Signifi-
cantly, though, even if the changes at work do not become broadly
economy-wide, they will still impact antitrust law greatly, since anti-
trust analysis proceeds market by market and industry by industry.
Accordingly, this Article takes the movement towards post-scarcity as
a given, and asks: What sort of competition law, if any, would be
needed? It argues that the likelihood that a post-scarcity economy will
develop hinges on changes in competition policy-that is, antitrust law
is not exogenous to the realization of a post-scarcity society. Despite
antitrust law's deep ties to economic theory and analysis, the implica-
tions of a post-scarcity society have not yet been appreciated. This
Article has two goals. First, it provides an account of the drivers of the
trend towards a post-scarcity society and how they will challenge the
heartland of antitrust legal analysis. Second, with that snapshot as a
springboard, this Article identifies and analyzes the normative conse-
quences for consumer welfare and antitrust law. To be sure, the inter-
dependent technological and social changes that are working to drive
costs down are still works in progress; an effort to describe and predict
their future interrelationship with antitrust law must necessarily be
20. Kaminska, supra note 6. See generally Paul Krugman, Opinion, Sympathy for
the Luddites, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/opinion/
krugman-sympathy-for-the-luddites.html (discussing the effects of "global technologi-
cal trends"); Tom Streithorst, The Economics of Mad Max and Star Trek, L.A. REV.
BOOKS (June 21, 2015), https://lareviewofbooks.org/essay/the-economics-of-mad-max-
and-star-trek [https://perma.cc/MLY8-JM83] (discussing a potential future where
"technology has advanced so far it seems almost magic" and "[w]e manufacture
iPhones and steak dinners out of thin air").
21. Krugman, supra note 3.
22. See Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in
4 ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMIcs 82, 97 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010) (ex-
plaining and applying these standard questions in antitrust law).
23. This Article uses the term "competition law" to denote a broader body of law
worldwide that aims to address anticompetitive restraints whether private or public in
origin, and uses "antitrust law" to denote the American approach focusing over-
whelmingly on private restraints with a very limited application to anticompetitive use
of state power. Because of the large scope of overlap, the terms are mostly
interchangeable.
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partial, tentative, and quickly outdated. Nevertheless, the transforma-
tion that they are effecting is too important to disregard.
Of course, at first glance, one might ask: Why would a world in
which production costs approach zero need competition law-
wouldn't everything just be more or less free? This Article argues that,
perhaps counterintuitively, as we advance towards the potential for
zero cost production, the need for antitrust-and a different kind of
antitrust-may actually be greater. As a result, this Article proposes a
new role for antitrust in assisting the transition from the "legacy"
economy of scarcity to the predicted post-scarcity world. Taking the
potential of a post-scarcity world as a given, competition law should
recharge and focus itself on two targets: it should combat private ex-
clusionary conduct that threatens cost-reducing innovation and it
should fight the use of state power to maintain or create artificial scar-
city. Simply put, we need antitrust for the transition; there are reasons
to think that incumbent firms-and the policymakers who collect
rents from them-may have strong incentives to prevent the transition
to a post-scarcity society.
More specifically, this Article explains that in important recent ex-
amples, such as the Apple/eBooks antitrust case and the regulatory
responses to Uber, traditional industry incumbents have a powerful
incentive to engage in "anti-disruption"-that is, it is optimal for them
to harm social welfare by inhibiting technology-driven cost reductions.
In making this argument, this Article proceeds with the four following
Parts. Part II provides an overview of the changes that are leading
observers to predict an imminent post-scarcity economy. Then Part
III, using the United States v. Apple (eBooks) antitrust case as a jump-
ing-off point, sketches an approach to anti-disruption; it further ex-
plains that antitrust's traditional balance of fears of increased market
power versus hopes for increased efficiency of production tips towards
more active antitrust as production costs approach zero-essentially,
there remains less and less cost left to wring out through greater effi-
ciency. In Part IV, the focus turns towards the adverse competitive
effects of state power; the desire for economic profits may drive firms
towards expending more effort at rent-seeking by using private an-
ticompetitive restraints or lobbying government for favorable anti-
consumer action. Therefore, some prescriptions are provided. While
American antitrust law already has a history of taking aim at private,
and to a lesser degree, public anticompetitive restraints, the transition
to a post-scarcity economy will require a rethink-and to some degree
a rejection-of the Chicago School dogma that forced a retrenchment
in addressing private exclusionary conduct. It will also require a will-
ingness to take a more aggressive tack against anticompetitive govern-
ment action than federal courts traditionally have done. As a result, to
the extent that firms currently face a choice between investing in
achieving greater efficiencies on the one hand or spending to achieve
6 [Vol. 4
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market power through collusion, exclusion, or lobbying the state on
the other, a post-scarcity world makes the latter set of welfare-de-
stroying choices more attractive; a brief conclusion notes the potential
magnitude of the gain that could result from stopping private interests
from preventing a post-scarcity world.
II. TOWARDS A POST-SCARCITY ECONOMY?
Our digital age runs on the increased speed, power, and influence of
Internet-linked computers, making possible previously unexpected
levels of mass collaboration, and the large-scale collection and analy-
sis of data.24 These developments give us more powerful information
and communication devices; ordinary people now "own electronic
toys that millionaires and kings would have lusted for a decade ago."2 5
Recent applications to the manufacturing and service sectors have
forced thinkers from a variety of fields to contemplate the birth of a
post-scarcity economy.
To identify, in a general way, what thinkers describe as a post-scar-
city economy, this Part sets forth two defining accounts. First, it sets
out the predictions and positive descriptions recently emerging from
writers, economists, and others. Second, it reviews the impact that
post-scarcity thinking has had in the field of intellectual-property law;
in particular, IP scholars have identified a series of technologies that
drive the trend towards a post-scarcity society, at least with respect to
IP. Finally, this Part considers the implications of these two accounts
for thinking about production costs and efficiency-longstanding
touchstones for competition law.
A. Star Trek vs. Margaret Atwood vs. Paul Krugman
The idea of a post-scarcity society made possible by technology has
been a staple of science fiction and futuristic thinking. But as it has
become easier to imagine it becoming reality, writers and economists
have sketched out both optimistic and pessimistic visions of how soci-
ety would handle the innovation that could enable this transition. The
optimistic view often revolves around analogies to Star Trek's "Repli-
cator"; the pessimistic view can be seen in dystopian science fiction
such as Margaret Atwood's Booker Prize-shortlisted Oryx and
Crake.2 6
Almost a half-century ago, the renowned architect, author, and in-
ventor R. Buckminster Fuller argued for "do[ing] away with the abso-
lutely specious notion that everybody has to earn a living," since "one
24. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUC-
TION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
25. Tom Streithorst, Post-Scarcity Economics, L.A. REV. BOOKS (July 11, 2013),
https://lareviewofbooks.org/essay/post-scarcity-economics [https://perma.cc/HX2Q-
CZUT].
26. MARGARET ATwOOD, ORYX AND CRAKE (Doubleday 2003) (2003).
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in ten thousand of us can make a technological breakthrough capable
of supporting all the rest."27 Perhaps the most common depiction is
that of 24th century human society in the "Star Trek" television series
and films; as the character Captain Jean-Luc Picard states, "[t]he ac-
quisition of wealth is no longer the driving force of our lives." 28 This
optimistic view is compelling; in particular, the image of the Star Trek
Replicator has been magnetic for economic and legal commentators
contemplating a possible post-scarcity future. For example, the econo-
mist J. Bradford DeLong has observed that "[w]e don't yet have repli-
cators, but we've progressed far beyond the conditions that made life
nasty, brutish and short hundreds of years ago for all but the elite." 29
Similarly, Paul Krugman has contemplated the Replicator's implica-
tions for economics:
So, in Star Trek they have a replicator that can make any thing
you want. But it makes any thing you want. Even now, we spend
only 30 per cent of our income on goods the rest is for services, and
the replicators won't help with that. We have fewer manufacturing
workers but lots and lots of nurses, so. So that's the point. We can
imagine a world where all services are provided as well. We have
robots or something to do the services.
While still nonexistent, the Replicator itself has become a kind of
totem for economists and others when thinking about what a post-
scarcity society would look like;31 indeed, a popular line of 3D printer
is sold under the name "Replicator."3 2
But not all views of such quantum technological change are optimis-
tic. In her acclaimed dystopian novel Oryx and Crake, Margaret
Atwood sketches a much darker view of how society might assimilate
dramatic changes in its technological ability. The world she sketches
has dramatic technological capabilities-notably biotechnological-
that are monopolized for the benefit of a very small subset of the
27. Elizabeth Barlow, The New York Magazine Environmental Teach-In, N.Y.,
Mar. 30, 1970, at 24, 30.
28. Stephen Baxter, The Cold Equations: Extraterrestrial Liberty in Science Fic-
tion, in THE MEANING OF LIBERTY BEYOND EARTH 13, 26 (Charles S. Cockell ed.,
2015).
29. Rapoport, supra note 7.
30. Izabella Kaminska, "You See, Money Doesn't Exist in the 24th Century," FIN.




31. See, e.g., Chinh H. Pham, Could Star Trek's Replicator Become a Reality with
3D Printing Technology?, NAT'L L. REV. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.
com/article/could-star-trek-s-replicator-become-reality-3d-printing-technology [https:/
/perma.cc/Z5YH-EG4K].
32. Tony Hoffman, MakerBot Replicator Desktop 3D Printer, PC (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2491092,00.asp [https://perma.cc/77SD-
W2WV?type=image] (reviewing the latest edition of a leading model of 3D printer,
named the "Replicator").
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world's population.33 The economic structure leads to the deployment
of technology largely in the service of positional goods involving per-
sonal appearance, and to resource crises outside the "charmed cir-
cle"-as well as disenchantment that leads to disaster.34
Besides economists and science-fiction writers, the question of how
society might embrace technology-driven abundance has drawn the
attraction of another group necessarily charged with thinking about
the future: Wall Street. The idea that new technologies are about to
create a society of abundance that will look radically different from
what we are used to has started to register on investment analysts'
radar.3 5 These analysts suggest that technologies such as artificial in-
telligence, Big Data, and the Internet of Things "all destroy existing
systems and replace them with new ones" that will "[i]ncrease living
standards by lowering costs and improving quality." 36 While costs
have been driven downward by technological change in the past, these
analysts observe that the changes currently involved are more drastic
than traditional innovation that lowered cost or improved quality;
"[d]igital innovations in particular often provide products more con-
veniently and cheaply, but via substitution or the redistribution of
sales rather than the creation of new incremental sales."" And in-
deed, the fact that financial markets value Uber more than General
Motors and Airbnb more than Marriott Hotels suggests that investors
agree that these are changes of a great magnitude.3 8 As a result, such
33. See ATWOOD, supra note 26.
34. See id. For a similar view of technological benefit for the few in a society with
overweening corporate power, see also CHANG-RAE LEE, ON SUCH A FULL SEA
(2014).
35. See Izabella Kaminska, The Mainstreaming of Technological Abundance




"[t]echno-utopianism is no longer the fringe view of some wildly over-optimistic guys
at MIT" and that "[i]n the last two years, techno abundance has become a core invest-
ment thesis").
36. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Global Markets: A
Short Paper on Everything, INDEPENDENT STRATEGY 3 (Oct. 23, 2015), http://
www.instrategy.com/download/Reports/A-short-paper-on-everything-231015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4SM-YMAGJ).
37. Izabella Kaminska, Disrupting FREEDOM!, FIN. TIMES: FT ALPHAVILLE
(July 30, 2015, 4:55 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/07/30/2135837/disrupting-free
dom [https://web.archive.org/web/20151002065149/http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/07/30
/2135837/disrupting-freedom/] (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
James Ainley et al., Disruptive Innovations III: Ten More Things to Stop and Think
About, CITi GPS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES & SOLUTIONS (July 2015), https://codex.
com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Citi-Disruptive-Innovation-Report-July-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GCE-RVZW] [hereinafter CITI GPS]).
38. Richard Read, Uber Is Now Worth More than General Motors. Yes, Really,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR: IN GEAR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/Busi-
ness/In-Gear/2015/1207/Uber-is-now-worth-more-than-General-Motors.-Yes-really
[https://perma.cc/6WXS-GF6H] (reporting "significantly higher" valuation); Rolfe
TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW
analysts view technological progress as having experienced a quantum
change "akin to a supply shock" whereby "lower unit costs and
heightened competition . . . ought to generate lower levels of con-
sumer prices than might otherwise be the case."3
Nonetheless, these analysts have also recognized that a shift to a
post-scarcity economy via technological abundance will not be with-
out opponents. Incumbent firms now understand the challenge of dis-
ruptive innovation; 40 as a result, some analysts worry that "companies
are playing defense and trying to protect existing profit pools in an
innovation environment that is increasingly disruptive." 4 1 Indeed, this
concern has driven a number of intellectual-property law commenta-
tors to consider what the move towards post-scarcity means for IP-
heavy industries-the next Section focuses on their accounts.
B. Post-Scarcity Economics and the Law
Among legal commentators, IP scholars have been particularly pre-
scient at grappling with the possible emergence of a post-scarcity soci-
ety. For IP, this was perhaps a natural development-at its core, the
field confronts regimes of state power designed to create artificial
scarcity for products such as books, software, and pharmaceuticals,
where the marginal cost of production may be quite low or zero, but
the fixed or first-unit costs may be tremendous. Indeed, early inklings
of post-scarcity thinking can be discerned in scholarship that ad-
dressed, for example, the shifting of trademarks' value from source
identification to inherent worth as status goods because of state-en-
forced artificial scarcity.42 This vein of IP scholarship has important
implications for antitrust law. In particular, the trends these scholars
identify in specific industries-drastic cost reductions coupled with in-
cumbents' attempts to preserve their profitability with steps that
sometimes hurt consumers-should also challenge antitrust scholars
to rethink their existing approaches.
Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb's $24 Billion Valuation,
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-math-of-
airbnbs-24-billion-valuation-1434568517 [http://web.archive.org/web/20160622043700/
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-math-of-airbnbs-24-billion-valuation-
1434568517] (reporting investors' higher valuation of Airbnb than Marriott).
39. Izabella Kaminska, Inflationistas and the Global Supply Shock, FIN. TIMES: FT
ALPHAVILLE (July 30, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/07/30/1585982/in
flationistas-and-the-global-supply-shock [https://web.archive.org/web/20151203
235256/http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/07/30/1585982/inflationistas-and-the-global-sup
ply-shock/] (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting the UBS Global Eco-
nomic Perspectives Report).
40. See generally Jon M. Garon, Mortgaging the Meme: Financing and Managing
Disruptive Innovation, 10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 441 (2012) (discussing the
need to be aware of and plan for disruptive innovation).
41. Kaminska, supra note 37 (quoting CITI GPS).
42. See Beebe, supra note 18.
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A recent body of literature has emerged in which IP scholars have
identified specific technological advances as the drivers of post-scar-
city developments; these technologies include 3D printing, robotics,
synthetic biology, and, adding value by knitting all of these together
with users and producers, the ever-evolving Internet.4 3 In particular,
IP commentators believe 3D printing will enable the Internet to chal-
lenge the fundamentals of patent law in the way that digitized content
and file-sharing software upended copyright law and the music indus-
try-as one article puts it: "Patents, Meet Napster."4 4 3D printing has
drawn IP scholars' attention for several reasons. First, the possibility
of a 3D printer in millions of private homes-much like the mass dis-
tribution of Internet-connected personal computers did with copy-
righted music-conjures the specter of "decentralized piracy" of
protected physical objects.4 5Accordingly, enforcement would become
much more difficult. Second, 3D printing creates gaping loopholes in
IP doctrine in places where they did not exist before, at least not to
such a degree.4 6 Finally, 3D printing may disrupt intellectual-property
protections that rely not just on law, but also on physical limits to
prevent infringement."
Besides 3D printing, several other technologies have drawn IP
scholars to consider a post-scarcity world's impact on their field of
study. First, synthetic biology may reduce the need for pharmaceutical
patents. Mark Lemley raises the possibility that such technologies will
one day enable doctor's offices to custom produce gene therapies.4 8
Second, he posits that, as digital music did to copyright and 3D print-
ing may do to patent law, "[a]dvances in robotics may bring . . . dis-
ruption to the service economy."4 9 In particular, he points out the
transition from specific-purpose robots (such as in auto assembly) to
general-purpose robots will allow robotic technology to "advance with
the speed of software, not hardware."s0 In other words, general-pur-
pose robots that can serve as generative platforms will allow owners to
harness the shared creativity of the online world.
43. See supra note 11 (listing articles discussing existing and potential tensions be-
tween existing IP law and 3D printing).
44. Desai & Magliocca, supra note 11.
45. Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing: Decentral-
ized Piracy, 65 HASTINGs L.J. 1483, 1486 (2014) (warning of such "decentralized
piracy").
46. James Grimmelmann, Indistinguishable from Magic: A Wizard's Guide to Cop-
yright and 3D Printing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 683, 696 (2014) (explaining that
copyright laws may prohibit "unauthorized 3D printing, even where the resulting ob-
ject is not copyrightable").
47. Desai & Magliocca, supra note 11, at 1710.
48. Lemley, supra note 11, at 479 ("[I]t is certainly possible to imagine a time in
which every doctor's office can generate custom genes to order.").
49. Id.
50. Id. at 480.
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Indeed, as a kind of turbocharging factor, IP commentators point
out that the connectivity enabled by the Internet makes technologies
such as 3D printing, synthetic biology, and robotics even more power-
ful. People worldwide can more easily share instructions, plans, reci-
pes, and the like for how to use these technologies." Accordingly,
both the fixed and marginal costs of employing these technologies
may drop dramatically. The next Section considers how changes in
production costs may create a post-scarcity world.
C. Beyond IP-Falling Marginal and Fixed Costs of Production
While IP scholars have created a recent lively discussion about a
post-scarcity world, other commentators have assessed the post-scar-
city paradigm's fit within the changing broader economy. Though
these predictions can easily sound a bit "pie in the sky," they are be-
ginning to draw serious consideration. As Lemley writes:
[Njew technologies promise to do for a variety of physical goods
and even services what the Internet has already done for informa-
tion.... Combine the[ ] four developments-the Internet, 3D print-
ing, robotics, and synthetic biology-and it is entirely plausible to
envision a not-too-distant world in which most things that people
want can be downloaded and created on site for very little money
52
New York Times bestselling author Jeremy Rifkin has termed this
"The Zero Marginal Cost Society"-despite the title, he also ad-
dresses falling fixed costs;5 3 similarly, in their Amazon bestseller
Abundance, Peter H. Diamandis and Steven Kotler echo the theme of
technology-driven progress eliminating scarcity.54
The argument that technology-driven abundance will lower margi-
nal, that is, incremental per-unit production, costs is fairly straightfor-
ward. First, a larger, and growing, share of GDP derives from
intellectual property, where low- to zero-marginal cost is common-
think recorded music, books, and pharmaceuticals. Second, transpor-
tation and distribution make up a significant chunk of marginal cost;
these factors are decreasing as some products (think music and books)
are increasingly distributed as electrons to an iPad rather than as hard
51. See id. at 462, 487, 494.
52. Id. at 461-62.
53. RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 11, 23, 256 ("[A]n economy based on scarcity is
slowly giving way to an economy of abundance.").
54. PETER H. DIAMANDIS & STEVEN KOTLER, ABUNDANCE: THE FUTURE IS BET-
TER THAN YOU THINK 9 (2012) ("Abundance for all is actually within our grasp
[though i]n this modern age of cynicism, many of us bridle in the face of such procla-
mation."); see also PHILIP SADLER, SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN A POST-SCARCITY
WORLD 7 (2010) ("The world's most highly developed economies ... are moving at an
accelerating pace towards a state of post-scarcity, an age of abundance, a state in
which an ever wider range of economic goods and services are available in abundant
supply and at extremely low cost").
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products, and as distribution networks are made more efficient
through Internet-enabled coordination (think Amazon). Finally, per-
unit labor costs may also potentially decrease due to advances in
robotics.
However, commentators also observe that technological change is
driving this change by lowering not only marginal, but also fixed and
first-unit, costs of production. Several examples illustrate this. First, IP
scholars have noted how Internet-driven connectivity and digital dis-
tribution have lowered the entry barrier to produce creative content.
In short, aspiring journalists no longer need access to a printing press,
and musicians have little to no need for a record press. Technological
change has removed these initial fixed costs of production. Second,
Rifkin argues that 3D printing reduces the need for large-scale manu-
facturing plants and this change, along with mass-collaborative pro-
duction of software and designs, and breakthroughs in energy
production, all create a "new economic infrastructure."ssAs an illus-
tration, Deven Desai points to the extreme difficulty of producing a
working firearm at home prior to 3D printing-and the relative ease
after its introduction.5 6 Finally, increased interconnectivity and al-
gorithmic processing can now replace hardwired communications in-
frastructure. Take, for example, Uber: adding software to preexisting,
general-use, Internet-linked smartphones made it unnecessary that
Uber invest in a high-fixed-cost taxi dispatching station and radio sys-
tem, let alone a fleet of cabs.
In fact, some industries are seeing technology-driven falls in both
their marginal and fixed costs. The Apple/eBooks antitrust case,
which will be discussed in detail in the next Part, presents a good ex-
ample." The agreements between Apple and the major hardcopy
book publishers concerning the latter's sale of eBooks took place
against the backdrop of a rapidly changing industry. Via its booksell-
ing website, its Kindle eBook reading device, and its own publishing
arm, Amazon was driving down the initial cost of producing the first
copy of a book as well as the marginal cost of each additional unit.59
Note the lowering of fixed or initial-unit costs: no longer was access to
a printing press required, and Amazon was developing systems that
provided traditional publishers' curation and promotion functions at a
lower cost. To a great degree, the agreements between Apple and the
publishers were an attempt to bolster the hardcopy book market by
slowing or rolling back the adoption of eBooks.
55. RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 214.
56. See Deven Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and Dis-
ruption, 65 HASTINGs L.J. 1469, 1473 (2014) (discussing how the legal situation that
"[u]nder [existing] federal law, anyone can make a gun at home" takes on new signifi-
cance in a world of home 3D printing).
57. See infra Section IV.A.
58. See infra Section III.A.
59. See infra Section III.A.
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This example illustrates that, even if technology is driving down
fixed and marginal costs, these forces will reach their full potential is
not inevitable. Desai worries that "incumbents may seek new laws to
protect their positions" from these technology-driven disruptions, that
"as soon as digitization offers a method of control, it will be exerted,"
and that "new oligopolies will emerge."6 0 The concern that the emer-
gence of a post-scarcity economy will be thwarted by acts that incum-
bents find profitable, but that reduce social welfare, is what must force
competition law to take notice.
III. A COMPETITION-LAw RESPONSE?
None of this, however, will happen by itself or of its own accord.
The system is not self-adjusting, and, without purposive direction, it
is incapable of translating our actual poverty into our potential
plenty.
-John Maynard Keynes 61
Our prosperity requires productivity growth: technological ad-
vances that continue to allow us to make goods and services more
cheaply. Star Trek is the extrapolation of this trend. If it costs hardly
anything to produce goods, then everyone can afford almost every-
thing. . . . [But] [w]hat if the benefits of productivity gains are mo-
nopolized by the top one percent, as they largely have been for most
of the past 30 years?
-economics columnist Tom Streithorst62
Changes all around us-starting with IP, but reaching beyond-
have led leading economists to consider the possibility of a post-scar-
city society. Even if the post-scarcity shift does not take place across
all sectors, and instead remains confined to a subset of industries, this
shift would still be critical for antitrust law, whose analysis proceeds
market by market and industry by industry. Moreover, technology-
driven abundance is not inevitable, and countervailing forces may
seek to thwart it to protect their own interests. In general, concerted
actions aimed at anticompetitive means fall within the heartland of
antitrust enforcement's focus. However, because of its retrenchment
since the onset of the Chicago School-aimed at cabining antitrust's
targets to a narrow set of horizontal restraints on price and output
without any redeeming virtue-antitrust will require a shift in its atti-
tude and energy. This Part explains that some incumbents may choose
to engage in what this Article terms "anti-disruption" in order to pre-
serve profit margins against dramatic cost-reducing innovation-such
conduct can be privately rational yet harmful to social welfare overall.
60. Desai, supra note 56, at 1480-81.
61. KEYNES, supra note 19.
62. Streithorst, supra note 25 (continuing on to describe this as the world of Mar-
garet Atwood's novel Oryx and Crake).
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In doing so, this Part first presents the United States v. Apple (eBooks)
case as an example of anti-disruption and then proceeds to discuss the
related implications of the trend towards post-scarcity for the antitrust
analysis of efficiencies and essential facilities. The takeaway: Antitrust
must become more active to prevent the post-scarcity society from
being smothered in its cradle.
A. Protecting Innovation by Preventing "Anti-Disruption": The
Apple/eBooks Case as Example
Once upon a time, whole industries-think music, broadcast televi-
sion, and newspapers-were blindsided by disruption. New, quantum-
level cheaper forms of distribution undercut their business models and
hollowed out their revenue sources-think Napster, Netflix, and on-
line news sites. However, disruption is no longer such a bolt out of the
blue. To be sure, the forces of technology-driven disruption continue
to rage. But now, businesses striving to be the "Uber of X"6 3 and the
very existence of an annual "TechCrunch Disrupt" conference demon-
strate that disruption itself is becoming a business model.64 As a result,
incumbents should be greatly less surprised to find themselves in the
crosshairs of the disrupters-and, as a result, incumbents may in the
future be more likely to take steps towards "anti-disruption. "65
While there have been embryonic antitrust responses to anti-disrup-
tion in the past,6 6 the most prominent fully-formed example is United
States v. Apple ("Apple") .67 In Apple, the Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division brought suit against five major book publishing compa-
nies and Apple Inc. ("Apple"), alleging that they conspired to raise
63. See Abby Phillip, 'The Uber of ... You Name It, WASH. PosT: POST NATION
(May 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/05/28/the-
uber-of-you-name-it [https://perma.cc/NL5Q-WDLF] (describing startups striving to
become or being labeled as "Uber for snowplows" and "an Uber-for-Laundry").
64. See Christian Lanng, At the World Economic Forum, A Study of Disruption
and Its Discontents, TECHCRUNCH: CRUNCH NETWORK (Jan. 20, 2016), http://tech-
crunch.com/2016/01/20/at-the-world-economic-forum-a-study-of-disruption-and-its-
discontents [https://perma.cc/463Z-N7K3] (describing the 2016 World Economic Fo-
rum's theme, "The Fourth Industrial Revolution," as recognition of "the disruption
happening everywhere today as part of a larger paradigm shift").
65. Id. (describing the multifaceted response of SAP, IBM, and global consulting
firms as evidence that "[d]isruption is being co-opted").
66. See, e.g., John R. Wilke & Tristan Mabry, Homestore.com Uses its Lock on
Listings to Widen Realtors Net, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB93389282
2858417880 (last updated Aug. 6, 1999, 10:20 AM) (discussing home selling website's
use of exclusive contracts with local realty boards to thwart rivals); Keith Regan,
Homestore.com Faces Antitrust Probe, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Apr. 26, 2000, 12:00
AM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/3133.html [https://perma.cc/WP2N-
65P7] (reporting U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division investigation into
Homestore.com and the National Association of Realtors); Salil Kumar Mehra, Infor-
mation in an Antitrust Age, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 241-42 (2000).
67. See United States v. Apple, Inc. (Apple II), 791 F.3d 290 (2d. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016); United States v. Apple Inc. (Apple 1), 952 F. Supp. 2d
638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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and fix the price for electronic books in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.68 While the publisher defendants settled the claims
against them, Apple proceeded to lose at trial and on appeal; a certio-
rari petition was denied by the Supreme Court.69 Apple's Supreme
Court case turned on a question regarding the standard of review for
vertical restraints, but, as for the case as a whole, the publishers' con-
duct in concert with Apple provides an example of anti-disruption.
In particular, the facts of Apple exemplify a concerted response by
incumbents to disruptive innovation that lowered both fixed and mar-
ginal costs. Although eBooks had existed since the early 1970s, their
adoption grew rapidly in the early twenty-first century due to Internet
distribution and increasingly useful e-readers using E Ink, a paper-like
display technology invented in the late 1990s at MIT and incorporated
first in the Motorola F3 e-reader in 2006.70 Although Amazon in-
vented neither E Ink nor the e-reader, the marriage of its successful
bookselling website to its Kindle e-reader drove the rapid adoption of
eBooks. 1 For consumers, eBooks are potentially a tremendous boon.
They make possible the significant reduction of both fixed costs (no
investment in printing presses, for example) as well as marginal costs
(considerably cheaper distribution and no per-copy printing and bind-
ing costs). This was not, however, a welcome development for the ma-
68. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 296.
69. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apple II, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016) (No. 15-565).
The cert. petition turned on the appropriate standard for analyzing vertical restraints
such as the contracts between Apple and its upstream suppliers (the book publishers).
It emphasizes the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin to contend that because Apple
stands in vertical relationship with the other cartel participants, Apple's conduct can-
not be reviewed under the per se rule; accordingly, the cert. petition echoes the dis-
sent in Apple II in claiming that the majority's contrary treatment creates a circuit
split with the Third Circuit's opinion in Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), and applying per se standard to claims involving
the horizontal relationship as competitors between allegedly conspiring Mack dealers
but the rule of reason standard to claims involving the vertical supplier-distributor
relationship of the parent Mack company with its dealers).
70. See A Very Short History of Ebooks, DIGITAL PUBLISHING 101, http://digital
publishingl0l.com/digital-publishing-101/digital-publishing-basics/a-very-short-his
tory [https://perma.ccIW4S7-6BEK] (last updated July 21, 2015, 6:45 AM) (ascribing
the beginnings of eBooks to Project Gutenberg in 1971, and discussing the develop-
ment of E Ink as a key turning point for the technology); see also Alec Klein, A New
Printing Technology Sets off a High-Stakes Race, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB946939872703897050 [http://web.archive.org/web/20160626084222/http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB946939872703897050] (last updated Jan. 4, 2000, 12:21 AM)
(discussing origins of E ink); E Ink Press Release: Motofone Makes Its Global Debut
Introducing Stylish Connectivity for Everyone, INTERNET ARCHIVE: WAYBACK MA-
CHINE (Nov. 28, 2006, captured Oct. 14, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/
20091014090758/http://www.eink.com/press/releases/pr96.html [https://perma.cc/
WB3U-8QBY] (touting the introduction of E ink in the 2006 Motofone F3).
71. Hui Li, Cannibalization or Market Expansion? The Impact of E-Books on
Print Book Sales 2 (Feb. 20, 201.5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613757 [https://perma.cc/
8HXL-Q74U].
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jor book publishers, who saw the increasing sales of eBooks
cannibalize their profitable market for hardback books but could not
risk alienating Amazon, the largest bookseller on Earth, by refusing to
sell eBooks. As a result, the traditional book publishers allegedly con-
spired with Apple, upon the launch of the iPad, to raise the prices of
eBooks. 7 2 For the publishers, this was driven by a desire to "anti-dis-
rupt" the threat of eBooks to their existing business model.
At a deeper level, the Apple case suggests a need for antitrust en-
forcement: incumbents now understand Internet-driven disruption
and face a strong incentive to take exclusionary steps to prevent it to
protect their existing positions. Indeed, such efforts may be seen in the
context of music downloads 73 and, allegedly, by broadband Internet
and cable incumbents to thwart video streaming firms such as Net-
flix.74 Where they currently enjoy oligopoly or monopoly rents, that
incentive for incumbents will be even stronger. Scott Hemphill and
Tim Wu have argued for the recognition of an antitrust violation they
term "parallel exclusion"-the concerted conduct "engaged in by mul-
tiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be market entrants."" Consid-
eration of concerted anti-disruption would be driven by a heightened
form of exclusion, one in which quantum leaps in cost reduction
through innovation are prevented and deterred, with potentially disas-
trous effects on overall welfare.
To be sure, Apple, in which each of the three judges on the Second
Circuit panel wrote an opinion, suggests some key challenges for
treating anti-disruption as an antitrust violation. Specifically, the opin-
ions highlight problems for judges in dealing with markets with rap-
idly falling costs, in comprehending competition that extends beyond
big incumbent players, and in understanding the incentives for domi-
nant incumbents to engage in anti-disruption. These problems and the
high cost of false negatives in this context-the inhibiting by market
incumbents of a move towards a post-scarcity world-require a re-
thinking of how antitrust enforcement should proceed.
Reforming antitrust enforcement to promote a transition to a post-
scarcity world will not be easy. First, the Second Circuit's majority
72. Apple II, 791 F.3d 290; Apple 1, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638.
73. See, e.g., Alexa Klebanow, Note, Is Music the Next eBooks? An Antitrust Anal-
ysis of Apple's Conduct in the Music Industry, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119 (positing
that Apple may be protecting its position in the music-download business versus in-
surgent streaming services by using exclusionary conduct that may violate antitrust
laws).
74. See Susan Crawford, How to Fight Telecom Gameplaying, BACKCHANNEL
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://medium.com/backchannel/how-to-fight-telecom-gameplaying-
aa3765edc385#.kmz8finex [https://perma.cc/VN25-VLVM] (arguing that the FCC
"needs to create rules for interconnection deals between the terminating monopolies
[such as Comcast and Verizon, which control the connection that terminates at the
user's home] and everyone else [such as Netflix and other services]").
75. C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1185
(2013).
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opinion in Apple and its contrast with the dissent suggest that courts
may struggle to accurately weigh the importance of falling fixed and
marginal costs, particularly where the extent to which they will fall is
uncertain. Apple shows that courts currently working under the indus-
trial age antitrust paradigm struggle to give appropriate weight to the
value of falling fixed and marginal costs. As noted in prior Sections, to
the extent antitrust has grappled with cost reductions, it has done so in
contexts involving mergers and joint ventures. And in these contexts it
has often struggled, for the simple reason that enforcement officials
and judges must make a prediction based on efficiency arguments that
may be difficult to prove.7 6 Indeed, the Apple case illustrates the inde-
terminacy of these arguments. The majority opinion leads off from its
first paragraph with the observation that while the printing press had
been a constant of book publishing for centuries, eBooks "had the
potential to change the centuries-old process for producing books by
eliminating the need to print, bind, ship, and store them."" The ma-
jority then goes on to note the impact of falling costs several more
times,7 as well as the publisher defendants' interest in preserving
their higher-cost-but also higher-priced and higher-profit-
hardcover book sales from the cost- and price-reducing impact of
eBooks' development.7 9 In contrast, the dissent at no point discusses
the cost-reduction impact through innovation that eBooks' develop-
ment represents.8 o However, it would be unfair to suggest that the
dissenting opinion has no appreciation for innovation; Chief Judge Ja-
cobs cites the impact of the iPad (without demonstrating that it could
not have been successfully launched without cartelizing eBooks) as
justification for Apple's participation in a price-fixing cartel." Under-
standably, it is easier to appreciate the effects of innovation when they
come in a shiny, tangible package than when they represent the intan-
gible economic boon of mass reading without the fixed- and marginal-
cost investments in a printing press for the first time since the Chinese
invented movable type a millennium ago.
Second, Apple illustrates the danger that judges may erroneously
hold on to a static paradigm in which competition takes place between
powerful incumbents; in particular, the dissent in Apple lets a picture
of a battle between Apple and Amazon hold it captive-ignoring the
76. See Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MicH. L. REV. 347,
374-76 (2011) (considering effect of argument that "efficiencies are difficult to
prove").
77. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 296.
78. Id. at 299, 328.
79. Id. at 298-301.
80. The dissenting opinion by Judge Jacobs does discuss cost repeatedly to suggest
that Amazon-which was not a party to the case and so did not have the opportunity
to litigate the facts nor legal allegations of predatory pricing concerning it-was sell-
ing below cost in a manner that he describes as "predatory" from the standpoint of
the defendants. Id. at 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 352.
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backdrop of innovation and massive cost reduction that impacts not
just competitors, but competition.8 2 The contrast between the majority
opinion and the dissent in the Apple case demonstrates the danger of
an emphasis on existing incumbents in an assumed static world. While
the iPad was a new product, both Apple and Amazon were huge and
valuable firms with a strong presence both online (iTunes/App Store
and Amazon.com) and in hardware (the iPhone/iPod/Mac and the
Kindle, respectively)." Indeed, the majority castigates the dissent for
too easily assuming that adding the iPad to the marketplace even re-
quired, let alone justified, the cartelization of publishers to throttle a
transformative technology in the form of eBooks.84 In part, the ten-
sion between the two opinions reflects a different appreciation of the
dynamic effects of emergent technology versus vigorous competition
between incumbent industry leaders. In the dissent's view, "Apple
took steps to compete with a monopolist"-allegedly, Amazon. 5 In
particular, Chief Judge Jacobs, who has written elsewhere about the
implicit biases of judges,8 6 accuses his colleagues of making "the im-
plicit assumption that competition should be genteel, lawyer-designed,
and fair under sporting rules."" However, he himself seems to be suf-
fering from the cognitive error of status quo bias; by reifying the inter-
est of big industry players like Amazon and Apple without
considering the value of eBooks themselves as rapidly emergent tech-
nological products that benefit consumers, he performs an antitrust
analysis that is at best, incomplete, and at worst, unmoored from the
anchor of American antitrust: consumer welfare.88
82. LUDWIG WIrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 53 (P.M.S. Hacker
& Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., 4th ed. 2009) ("A picture held
us captive. And we couldn't get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language
seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.").
83. See generally Wieczner, supra note 3 (proclaiming Apple "once again the most
valuable company in the world" after recently being supplanted); Paul R. La Monica,
Amazon is Now Worth WAY More than Walmart, CNNMONEY (July 24, 2015, 3:57
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/24/investing/amazon-worth-more-than-walmart
[https://perma.cc/VC92-HKUV] (noting that Amazon is among the dozen most valua-
ble companies on the S&P 500, and "the most valuable retailer in the world").
84. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 298 ("[T]he dissent's armchair analysis wrongly treats the
number of ebook retailers at any moment in the emergence of a new and transforma-
tive technology for book distribution as the sine qua non of competition in the market
for trade ebooks.").
85. Id. at 352 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
86. E.g., Dennis Jacobs, Lecture, The Secret Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2855, 2855 (2007) (lecturing about "judge[s'] inbred preference for outcomes con-
trolled by proceduralism, the adversary system, hearings and experts, representation
by lawyers, ramified complexity of doctrines and rules, multiple prongs, and all things
that need and use lawyers, enrich them, and empower them vis-A-vis other sources of
power and wisdom").
87. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
88. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare
Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2405, 2406 (2013) ("The promotion of eco-
nomic welfare as the lodestar of antitrust laws ... transformed the state of the law and
restored intellectual coherence to a body of law Robert Bork had famously described
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Finally, forces both within and outside of the legal system will tend
to support rulings that would sacrifice the benefits of a post-scarcity
society in favor of smaller gains to powerful private interests. The Ap-
ple case illustrates the incentive for incumbents to prevent the transi-
tion to a post-scarcity society. Their acts go beyond mere counter-
disintermediation-they are not merely seeking to preserve a buy-sell
price spread for wholesalers, brokers, and other intermediaries. Both
the dissent in United States v. Apple and the mass-media coverage of
the case89 provide strong examples of a willingness to sacrifice poten-
tially massive public gain due to falling fixed and marginal costs in
order to preserve private benefits to favored firms.
In effect, the dissent would immunize Apple's role in a cartel that
thwarts the transition to lower fixed and marginal costs for the reading
public. The dissenting opinion turns on two points of contention with
the majority. It mistakenly concludes that Apple's role in undermining
a claimed (but unadjudicated) monopoly-the bare existence of
which, unlike the act of monopolization, has long been held legal 9 0-
could offset liability for its participation in a horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy.91 Neither precedent nor prominent commentary support
this view. The Court in Trinko made clear that the Sherman Act
"seeks merely to prevent unlawful monopolization" and does not go
so far as "to eliminate the monopolies" that firms might otherwise en-
joy;92 by contrast, the Sherman Act has long been held to prohibit
price fixing." And as Herbert Hovenkamp, the single most prominent
commentator in antitrust, has long pointed out, it makes good sense to
treat price fixing more harshly than monopolization for a number of
reasons, not least of which is the relative speed and ease of making an
anticompetitive multi-firm agreement compared with building and
maintaining a long-lasting monopoly.94 As a result, a judge-granted
as paradoxical. . . . [T]here is now widespread agreement that this evolution toward
welfare and away from noneconomic considerations has benefitted consumers and the
economy more broadly." (footnotes omitted)).
89. See, e.g., infra note 95.
90. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir.
1945) (Hand, J.) ("It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had ... a monopoly, that it
'monopolized"' in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, since "monopoly may
have been thrust upon it" via "accident" or "superior skill, foresight and industry.").
91. Apple II, 791 F.3d at 347-48 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
92. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
415 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
93. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (applying
Section 1 and per se rule to price-fixing agreement).
94. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPE-
TITION AND ITS PRACTICE §5.1b (3d ed. 2006). Hovenkamp argues that multilateral
activity deserves closer antitrust scrutiny for several reasons:
1. The Sherman Act's structure emphasizes restraint of trade. Id.
2. "[A]greements creating significant market power can be formed very
quickly" while "[m]ost firms do not become monopolists overnight" since
"[r]ivals can generally be expected to resist a single firm's attempts to domi-
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plenary indulgence for price fixing due to contributions that erode a
quite possibly legal monopoly makes little sense.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the inclination to mis-
read an antitrust case in a manner that favors and insulates powerful
incumbent firms can only be found in conservative judges. The Apple
case drew heavy coverage from media outlets critical of the Justice
Department's decision to bring the case and especially of Amazon's
price-dropping effects on eBooks and by extension the overall book
market. In particular, The New Yorker magazine, notable for many
things but not generally for antitrust commentary, had four separate
articles on the case and the events surrounding it, each of which con-
tained significant criticism of or concern regarding Amazon-which
was not even a party.
nate its market." Id. By contrast for monopoly through agreement,
"[r]esistance is much less because the agreement creates market power by
bringing firms into the venture rather than excluding them from the mar-
ket." Id.
3. Monopoly alone is not illegal even though it restricts output, while in
agreements between competitors we consider lower output vs. increased ef-
ficiency and greater output.
Courts' ability to fashion relief has more flexibility and effectiveness with multiple
actors. Id. Contrast externally regulating the rates of American Express, a single firm,
with simply enjoining rate fixing by Visa-"a joint venture of some 6000 banks and
other financial institutions." Id.
95. See Vauhini Vara, Did Apple Fix E-Book Prices for the Greater Good?, NEW
YORKER: CURRENCY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
apple-claiming-virtue-e-book-price-fixing-case [https://perma.cc/B2U3-8P5Y] (consid-
ering the argument that Apple's role in a horizontal cartel was justifiable due to Ama-
zon's alleged role as an eBook monopolist); Matt Buchanan, The E-Book Conspiracy
Comes to a Close, NEW YORKER: ELEMENTS (July 11, 2013), http://
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-e-book-conspiracy-comes-to-a-close [https://
perma.cc/43LS-VYAE] (emphasizing that "[a] major beneficiary of the decision, Am-
azon, is not only one of the largest, most influential companies in technology but also
the dominant company in bookselling"); Ken Auletta, Paper Trail: Did Publishers and
Apple Collude Against Amazon?, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/25/paper-trail-2 [https://perma.cc/Z9T6-
W79L] (observing that "[t]he D.O.J. could have chosen not to bring" the case against
Apple and the book publishers, stating that "Amazon is already using its position in
the market to intimidate less powerful publishers," and quoting an anonymous small
publisher that "Amazon is using its monopoly power to dictate to these companies
that they will continue to discount our books below cost"); Ken Auletta, Publish or
Perish: Can the iPad Topple the Kindle, and Save the Book Business?, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/26/publish-or-perish
[https://perma.cc/C2Q5-WPPS] (reporting that "[m]any publishers believe that Ama-
zon looks upon books as just another commodity to sell as cheaply as possible, and
that it sees publishers as dispensable" and describing joint withholding of eBooks
from Amazon by publishers, but foregoing any discussion of potential collusion
liability).
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B. The Declining Importance of Efficiencies in a
Decreasing-Cost World
As the possibility of a post-scarcity society comes into view, anti-
trust must take a more skeptical view of efficiency arguments prof-
fered in defense of private restraints. Such arguments attempt to
justify the risk of increased market power by pointing to offsetting
efficiency gains that the restraint helps achieve; the most common ex-
ample is to ascribe potential production-cost savings to the restraint.96
Antitrust law should look more skeptically at such arguments because,
all things being equal, as the economy moves closer to zero-cost pro-
duction, any gains from reduced production costs must become in-
creasingly skimpy relative to the possible enhanced market power.
And importantly, antitrust authorities must consider the possibility
that alleged cost reductions and market-power enhancement from the
current baseline do not match the true potential in an economy capa-
ble of developing a post-scarcity society because artificial scarcity may
be "baked in" by existing distortive restraints.97 While such arguments
originated in the merger-review context, analogous arguments, though
they often go by other names, are also found in order to justify
agreements that otherwise might restrain trade in the Sherman Act
Section 1 context (ancillary procompetitive justifications) and exclu-
sionary conduct in the Section 2 context (legitimate business
justifications)."
Antitrust analysis' trade-off between economies or efficiencies on
the one hand and increased market power on the other is perhaps
most closely associated with the work of Nobel laureate Oliver Wil-
96. E.g., Dagher v. Saudi Ref., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd sub
nom. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
97. This problem is analogous to dealing with the so-called "Cellophane Fallacy"
in antitrust law, named after United States v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377 (1956), in which the Court had to consider whether cellophane had a separate
market, or competed with other flexible wrapping materials. While the Court applied
questions of product substitution that are still in use today, it did so without consider-
ing whether the possibility that cellophane was being sold at monopolistically high
prices was causing buyers to substitute with other flexible wrapping materials when
they would not do so if the products were all sold in competitive markets. The failure
to consider this "baked-in" price elevation has been called the Cellophane Fallacy,
and less commonly, the Gingerbread Paradox. See George W. Stocking & Willard F.
Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 29
(1955) (introducing the concept); see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is
Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 G EO.
L.J. 2055, 2089-90 (2012) (applying the concept of the Cellophane Fallacy to ques-
tions of IP and market power).
98. See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 927 (2016) (discussing in parallel similar approaches to restraints
with both positive and negative effects on competition in contexts involving Sherman
Act Section 1 multi-firm restraints and Section 2 single-firm monopolization).
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liamson.99 He recognized that where "a merger (or other combina-
tion) is proposed that yields economies [or efficiencies] but at the
same time increases market power ... then a rational treatment of the
merger question requires that an effort be made to establish" the rela-
tive effects of the efficiencies versus the "market power effects."o10
With a simple model that continues to have significant persuasive
power in American antitrust circles, Williamson pointed out that,
under normal assumptions, the decrease in the marginal cost of pro-
duction will swamp the market-power effects-implying that enforc-
ers should take efficiency defenses quite seriously.10 The reason for
this can be seen in Figure 1-the triangle representing the deadweight
loss due to transactions no longer taking place at the new, higher price
due to enhanced market power will tend to be smaller than the rectan-
gle representing efficiency gains-most typically a lowered production
cost (or alternatively, a qualitatively better product at the same cost as
before). 102 The same logic is used in considering restraints with posi-
99. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
100. Id. at 18-19.
101. See id. at 22-23 (concluding that his model shows that "generally it is evident
that a relatively modest cost reduction is usually sufficient to offset relatively large
price increases" and so "supports the following proposition: a merger which yields
non-trivial real economies must produce substantial market power and result in rela-
tively large price increases for the net allocative effects to be negative").
102. In Williamson's simple model, he showed mathematically why this is so. A
merger or other transaction or restraint would on balance improve social welfare
when the cost-reduction effects (the blue rectangle in Figure 1) are greater than the
deadweight loss (the red triangle in Figure 1).
The rectangle's area is (AC1 - AC2) Q 2 and the triangle's area is approximately(approximately because the demand curve would likely not actually be linear) 1h(P2 -
P1)(On - 02), since a triangle's area is half of the base times the height. Thus the
transaction will be welfare enhancing if:
( A AC)(Q2) > 1 (A P)( A 0)
Dividing through by Q2:
A AC > 'h ( A P)( A Q)/Q2
Substituting for ( A Q)/02 the expression p ( A P/P) where p is the elasticity of demand
(a measure of how much the quantity consumed changes relative to a change in price,
that is, p = ( A 0/Q) / ( A P/P)):
( A AC) > 'A ( A P) ( p ( A P/P))
Dividing through by k, an index of market power at the start such that P = k(AC), and
which is greater than or equal to 1, and which equals 1 in a perfectly competitive
market where competition forces prices down to production cost:
( A AC) / (k)(AC) > 'A ( A P)( p (A P/P))/P
Simplifying:
( A AC) / (AC) > 'h (k) p ( A P/P)2
Meaning that, where there is no preexisting market power (that is, k = 1), for exam-
ple, a 20% increase in price due to increased market power after the transaction will
be offset by a mere 2% reduction in production cost where p = 1 (that is, the quantity
consumed changes-in the opposite direction-by the same percentage as the change
in price). The implication is that fairly small cost reductions will outweigh fairly large
price increases. Id. at 18-19.
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tive and negative effects on competition under both Section 1 and Sec-















Technology-driven abundance has an important implication for this
model: as marginal costs of production approach zero, all other things
being equal, the anticompetitive market power effects' importance
should increase relative to the procompetitive efficiency effects. This
is true for two reasons. First, as shown in Figure 2, which is identical to
Figure 1 except for the fact that the original price (Pl) is far closer to
the zero-price horizontal axis, as costs approach zero, the same price
and output effects will generate relatively less offsetting efficiency rel-
ative to the deadweight loss-that is, all things being equal, the red
triangle will be bigger compared to the blue rectangle. Second, con-
sider what happens if the demand curve is as usually assumed and
flattens asymptotically along the x-axis as price goes to zero.
103. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (4th ed. 2011) §§ 5.6b, 6.4a
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FIGURE 2
P
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This is a common and normal assumption, seen for example in the
case of unitary elasticity of demand, that is, where a 1% increase in
price yields a 1% decrease in quantity demanded.10 4 Again, all things
being equal, as shown by Figure 3, which is identical to Figure 2 except
for the addition of the flattening demand curve that approaches the
zero-price horizontal axis asymptotically, the deadweight-loss triangle
will actually be bigger than it would have been at higher price and cost
levels (the dotted area represents the increase in deadweight loss due
to flattening of the demand curve as price and cost approach zero).
This is because, holding the price change constant as simply a function
of increased market power (the height of the triangle), the change in
quantity (the triangle's base), representing the volume of lost transac-
tions, increases.10 5 As a result, the transition to a post-scarcity econ-
omy raises some critical questions about one of the driving models in
contemporary antitrust law.
104. See, e.g., JOHN CREEDY, DEMAND AND EXCHANGE IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
34 (1992) ("[A] constant unit elasticity implies that the demand curve is a rectangular
hyperbola [that is, a parabola whose asymptotes are perpendicular, in this case being
the X and Y axes of price and quantity].").
105. An important caveat is that an incipient post-scarcity economy might yield
different parameters for elasticity or differently shaped demand curves; we cannot yet
determine empirically if that is so.
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As a result, an economy capable of achieving post-scarcity condi-
tions demands a much more critical approach to efficiency defenses.
There is some debate, both normative and positive, over how much
weight antitrust enforcers should and currently do give to efficiency
defenses.1 0 6 Some commentators argue that American antitrust en-
forcers should be willing to permit, for example, mergers that benefit
producers more than they hurt consumers, even where the benefits
are not redistributed via market competition to make both groups bet-
ter off. 0 7 Others argue that, in various ways, American antitrust en-
forcers already apply a total-welfare standard,108 or account for the
difference between total welfare and consumer welfare via a "rough-
justice" approach.109 Essentially, the differences come down to "is" as
106. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 76, at 349 (arguing for enhanced consideration of
efficiency defenses in merger analysis).
107. These commentators argue that the United States should, like Canada, explic-
itly adopt a "total-welfare" standard rather than a consumer-welfare standard. See
Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An
Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRusr L.J. 471, 472-73 (2012) (arguing that, e.g., the
rule of reason should be applied as a total-welfare analysis rather than solely a con-
sumer-welfare analysis); Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert
Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. S19 (2014) (explaining that Robert Bork, though using the
term "consumer welfare," was actually advocating a total-welfare standard).
108. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We
Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 659 (2010) (arguing that, in Section 2 cases, courts
have been using a total-welfare approach rather than a purchaser-welfare approach as
other scholars believe).
109. See Crane, supra note 76, at 364-65 (speculating that antitrust regulators may
in practice be implementing an approach advocated in the past by Profs. Fisher and
Lande to "liberaliz[e] merger policy overall" to make up for the fact that merger-
justifying efficiencies exist, but "are hard to detect on a case-specific basis"); see also
Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1651-68 (1983) (discussing positives and negatives of the
different approaches).
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well as "ought" arguments about whether Paretoo10 or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency"11 for consumers and producers, each separately aggregated
as a unit, is the right standard1 1 2-the issue is whether it matters if the
remaining market competition is sufficient that it could generate com-
pensation to consumers via lowering prices enough to make up for the
deadweight loss that consumers would otherwise suffer. These argu-
ments have raged fairly prominently in the antitrust community this
century.1 13
An important implication of a move towards post-scarcity is that
existing antitrust debates about total welfare as a standard (that is,
balancing cost reduction benefits to producers with harms to consum-
ers) versus focusing solely on consumer welfare increasingly become
obsolete. This is because to the extent that production costs approach
zero, lowering marginal cost becomes much less important relative to
market power effects, whether the decrease in marginal cost would be
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices or not. In short, as
possible cost reductions become smaller and smaller, the question of
whether they offset harm to consumers tends to become moot. This is
crucial because this type of balancing analysis extends beyond the
merger context and in fact ranges across antitrust law. While most
prominent in merger review, the analysis of Section 1 restraints and
Section 2 monopolization both involve the question of offsetting
procompetitive gains. We can see clear examples in many cases involv-
ing media, intellectual property, and innovation. For example, in
landmark Section 1 cases such as NCAA v. University of Oklahomall4
and Broadcast Music v. CBS," the Supreme Court squarely ad-
dressed the question of whether agreements among competitors to re-
strict output and price could be justified by countervailing gains in
efficiency and productive capacity. In its monopolization discussion in
United States v. Microsoft, the en banc D.C. Circuit directly addressed
the possibility of legitimate business justifications that would preclude
liability for otherwise actionable predatory or exclusionary conduct.' 1 6
In both contexts, the standard requires courts to balance the procom-
petitive benefits against the anticompetitive harms. Because the most
110. A state where it is not possible to improve any party's circumstances without
also worsening at least one other party's circumstances.
111. A state where, even if one party benefits from a decision, other parties' cir-
cumstances are not worsened.
112. Consumers taken as a unit and producers taken as a unit, since, for example,
those consumers who suffer the deadweight loss due to a merger will not necessarily
be the same ones who might enjoy lower prices because the merger lowers marginal
cost and competition forces some of that efficiency gain to be passed on to consumers.
113. See supra notes 107-109 (listing and describing leading articles in this debate).
114. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-108 (1984).
115. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18-22 (1979).
116. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(per curiam).
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commonly asserted 117-and most important-procompetitive benefits
revolve around reducing cost and increasing productive capacity, as
costs fall towards zero, this balance will shift against defendants, all
things being equal.
Crucially, antitrust courts will have to reconsider efficiencies based
not only on the current state of the market in the cases directly before
them, but will also have to ask whether, were the current market a
competitive one, the proffered efficiency defenses would not matter.
As in the du Pont (cellophane) case, the question is not only about
market behavior at the current price level-courts must avoid the
"Cellophane Fallacy" of assuming that the current price level is com-
petitive and refrain from concluding that because products are cur-
rently substitutes, they would also be substitutes at a competitive price
level."1 s Similarly, and this will no doubt be a difficult inquiry, courts
in an economy with the capacity to generate a post-scarcity society
will have to ask whether the procompetitive benefits of a merger or
restraint are in part the result of preexisting anticompetitive practices
or conduct. For example, if a merger reduces cost below the pre-
merger state, but creates concentration that may tend to thwart the
drive toward a reachable zero-marginal-cost state, that would be a
harm worth weighing. This kind of assessment will likely be quite diffi-
cult, but as in the du Pont case, it may be critical to properly under-
standing a market.
In all three contexts-merger review and Sections 1 (multi-firm
conduct) and 2 (single-firm conduct) of the Sherman Act-antitrust
will have to consider decreasing its emphasis on efficiency defenses.
That in itself may actually simplify antitrust analysis, since it suggests
at some level cost-reducing efficiencies will matter less, reducing the
factors a court must consider or regulate.
C. Post-Scarcity and the Essential-Facilities Doctrine
An economy with the potential to generate a post-scarcity society
will also require American courts to reconsider the essential-facilities
doctrine. While versions of essential facilities have been adopted in
the competition law of the European Union and elsewhere, 119 the
United States Supreme Court, if not foreclosing it outright, has at
117. E.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010).
118. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5069; Rules of the Administration for Industry and
Commerce on the Prohibition of Abuses of Intellectual Property Rights for the Pur-
poses of Eliminating or Restricting Competition (proposed by the State Administra-
tion for Industry and Commerce) (China) (unofficial translation of draft for
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least kept a wary distance.1 2 0 But post-scarcity economics undermines
the three main arguments against adopting the essential-facilities
doctrine.
In particular, the technologies driving post-scarcity economics un-
dercut the strongest argument against essential facilities: that it weak-
ens incentives to make competitive investments since dominant firms
would not, for example, build infrastructure or invent new technology
lest a court appropriate the investment for a competitor's use. How-
ever, in the face of technological abundance, incumbents' desire to
exclude will not necessarily hinge on whether they themselves created
the disruptive technology. For example, in the Apple case, Apple and
the publisher defendants who constructed a group boycott had in-
vented neither eBooks nor e-readers such as the Nook or Kindle. In-
creasingly, essential-facilities arguments may take place against such a
factual backdrop in which a number of firms provide a necessary ele-
ment of a sufficient set ("NESS") to create a breakthrough innova-
tion-as opposed to the paradigm Justice Scalia described in the
Supreme Court's leading case on the doctrine, United States v. Trinko,
in which an essential facility was largely the product of a single dura-
ble monopoly. 1 21 Rewarding a firm that extracts monopoly rents1 2 2 in
a NESS situation due to its use of deception, government lobbying, or
strategic holdup does not promote the development of an essential
facility in the pro-innovation manner pointed out in Trinko. And the
sheer desire of a firm to recoup investment cannot, without more, jus-
tify exclusion; helping private firms recover stranded costs cannot and
should not be an antitrust function. Instead, an essential-facilities ap-
proach that builds, for example, on the injury-to-innovation limitation
proposed by Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, 1 2 3 justify-
ing exclusion and rejecting the doctrine only where the defendant ac-
tually created the cost-reducing disruptive technology it seeks to
exclude, may be increasingly necessary as we approach a post-scarcity
society.
Additionally, the single-monopoly-profit argument against essential
facilities 2 4 collapses in a post-scarcity world. That argument posits
that since a monopolist need not sell to consumers, but could license
an essential facility for an equivalent royalty, there is no need for the
120. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 410-11 (2004).
121. The essential facility in Trinko was the local telephone exchange network, cre-
ated by Verizon during its period as a regulated monopoly. See id. at 402.
122. Economic rent is simply the difference between actual income and that income
level required to bring a factor of production into its current use.
123. Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation
and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2010) (advocating limiting recovery for IP injuries
only to cases in which external harm would "affect[ ] the ex ante incentive to
innovate").
124. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 229 (1978); Richard A. Posner,
Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 523-24 (1974).
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monopolist to exclude unless it is somehow procompetitive. 1 2 5 How-
ever, this argument is based on a static view of the market and is built
on several critical assumptions, including the idea that the monopo-
list's product is an input into other products in competitive markets,
that demand is observable, and that downstream products do not re-
quire product-specific investments that cannot easily be repur-
posed.12 6 in contrast, with respect to each of these three assumptions,
in the networked post-scarcity world, it is not hard to imagine that a
monopolist with an essential facility may exclude a downstream firm
when it sees that the latter's products may grow to supplant the for-
mer's notwithstanding the possibility of a license. Additionally, it is
quite possible that demand may not be easily observable, especially
where competition is "for the market," 1 27 and that investments in plat-
forms, networks, and the like are in fact not easily repurposed by the
second-place finisher.
The third major argument against essential facilities also weakens in
a post-scarcity world. That concern is that the essential-facilities doc-
trine places courts into the role of regulators, and that courts are ill
suited to oversee the sharing that the doctrine demands. 1 28 To the ex-
tent that, in a post-scarcity world, the facilities at issue are increasingly
nonrivalrous designs or that the costs of sharing start to approach
zero, what costs remain may arise from commodities like network
bandwidth or server space that even judges may find it easier to put a
price tag on than they currently might in cases involving, for example,
proprietary pharmaceutical datal29 or mobile-phone hardware re-
search and development. 130
125. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
773c (4th ed. 2015) ("[A] monopolist cannot earn double profits by monopolizing a
second, vertically related market."); BORK, supra note 124, at 229 ("[V]ertically re-
lated monopolies can take only one monopoly profit."); Posner, supra note 124, at
524.
126. See Zachary Abrahamson, Comment, Essential Data, 124 YALE L.J. 867,
873-77 (2014) (critiquing the single-monopoly-profit argument with respect to
nonrivalrous data in the essential-facility context).
127. See, e.g., id. at 873 (discussing that demand for "essential data" may be
unobservable).
128. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004).
129. See Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facil-
ities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 444-45 (2002) (dis-
cussing a European Court of Justice decision applying the essential-facilities doctrine
to a proprietary system for aggregating pharmaceutical data).
130. See M. Brinkley Tappan & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Essential Questions About
Standard-Essential Patents in the U.S. and EU, 2 INT'L ANTITRUST BULL. 10, 11-12
(2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrustlaw/at
311000_newsletter_201302.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CFH-KUV7] (dis-
cussing the European Commission's application of the essential-facilities doctrine to
Samsung's standard-essential patents, and the FTC's application of a similar theory to
Motorola in the context of a consent decree).
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The discussion of essential facilities in a post-scarcity environment
must unfortunately be quite preliminary. But as technological abun-
dance progresses, this Article predicts that anti-disruption cases will
force courts and scholars to reappraise the essential-facilities doctrine
in the face of a falling-cost world.
IV. POST-SCARCITY, ARTIFICIAL SCARCITY, AND STATE POWER
If I am right in supposing it to be comparatively easy to make
capital-goods so abundant that the marginal efficiency of capital is
zero, this may be the most sensible way of gradually getting rid of
many of the objectionable features of capitalism. . . . Yet there will
be many social and political forces to oppose the necessary change.
-John Maynard Keynesl31
[Tlhere is at least one important respect in which the 21st-century
economy is different in a way that ought to have a significant effect
on macroeconomics: the much larger role of rents on intangible as-
sets.... There are a couple of obvious implications from this change
in the nature of corporate success. One is that profits are no longer
anything remotely resembling a "natural" aspect of the economy;
they're very much an artifact of antitrust policy or the lack thereof,
intellectual property policy, etc. Another is that a lot of what we
consider output is "produced" at low or zero marginal cost.
-Paul Krugmanl 32
While the preceding Part addressed the incentive to engage in pri-
vate anticompetitive conduct to price higher than increasingly low
costs, firms also face an incentive to influence the exercise of state
power so as to maintain such economic rents. Incumbent firms that
currently receive economic rents may face a strong incentive to spend
some of that surplus-the price they receive above cost-to lobby or
otherwise influence state actors to thwart insurgent disruptive firms.
The successes and travails of Uber exemplify the negative role that the
state may play in powering anti-disruption, and .help explain why
American antitrust law may be forced to more intrusively deal with
anticompetitive restrictions enforced with state power.
131. Robert Chernomas, Keynes on Post-Scarcity Society, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 1007,
1019 (1984) (first quoting JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EM-
PLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936), reprinted in 7 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES,
THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 221 (Donald E. Moggridge
ed., Palgrave Macmillan 1973); then quoting 14 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE COL-
LECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 132 (Donald E. Moggridge ed., Pal-
grave Macmillan 1973)).
132. Paul Krugman, How Are These Times Different?, N.Y. TIMES: THE CON-
SCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (June 19, 2013, 4:28 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/06/19/how-are-these-times-different [https://perma.cc/5MM6-7DHE].
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A. Uber, the Sharing Economy, and Artificial Scarcity
Uber is no stranger to controversy. Labor law, 1 3 3 tort and insurance
law, 1 34 and antitrust" have all been invoked in complaints about the
popular and highly valued (more than $50 billion recentlyl 3 6 )
ridesharing service. But regardless of whether one falls into a pro-,
anti-, or neutral camp regarding Uber, three insights about its devel-
opment are quite clear: Uber's development hinges on massive cost
reductions, its challenge to the traditional taxi industry raises impor-
tant questions about the need for and social utility of taxi regulation
regimes, and it has received fierce pushback from regulators-often
asserting "passenger safety" concerns, but with the concommitant ef-
fect of maintaining an artificial scarcity of taxis and their competitors,
as well as an existing flow of revenue to the state. These facts provide
an important example that helps illuminate the potential role of the
state in aiding incumbents in keeping rents-and hurting consumers-
via anti-disruption.
Love it or hate it, Uber and its competitor ridesharing services have
revealed previously hidden realities about taxi service.1 3 7 In particular,
the rapid growth of Uber hinges on important, dramatic reductions in
both fixed and marginal costs.' 3 Think about what a taxi ride re-
quires: a way to match rider and driver, a driver, a car, gasoline, insur-
ance. Some of these are relatively fixed, first-unit costs-you need a
system for matching drivers and riders, and a car-others vary more
133. See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016) (setting forth an approach to classifying sharing-
economy workers within existing labor law); Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of
Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 100-102 (2015) (discussing Uber's relation-
ship to, and potential effect on, labor standards).
134. See Jennie Davis, Note, Drive at Your Own Risk: Uber Violates Unfair Compe-
tition Laws by Misleading UberX Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C. L.
REv. 1097, 1106-08 (2015) (describing insurance coverage gaps-allegedly exacer-
bated by Uber's own policies-that put drivers at risk of becoming uninsured
tortfeasors).
135. See Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of
Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016) (discussing antitrust complaints about
Uber's pricing algorithm).
136. Douglas MacMillan & Telis Demos, Uber Valued at More than $50 Billion,
WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-
1438367457 [https://web.archive.org/web/20160615035447/http://www.wsj.com/articles/
uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-1438367457] (last updated July 31, 2015, 8:50
PM).
137. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 133, at 86-91 (observing that Uber seems to have
created a "functioning market for car-hire services" that avoids the high search costs
and monopoly rents of traditional taxi services, but listing other social costs involving
labor law issues, discrimination, and privacy violations that Uber may facilitate or
commit).
138. See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 293, 295-96 (2016) (observing that "key efficiencies" of firms like
Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb stem in part from avoidance of fixed costs of traditional
service).
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with each ride, such as gasoline and driver-hours worked.13 9 What
Uber reveals is a tremendous amount of idle capacity. America's cars
are used on average one hour per day, and millions of underemployed
Americans possess available time and driver's licenses.1 4 0 Like other
"sharing economy" enterprises that seize on idle capacity,1 41 Uber's
app-based platform drives down fixed and first-unit costs, as well as
marginal costs of providing rides, through the use of the smartphones
that almost two-thirds of Americans already carry1 42 and the absorp-
tion of idle capacity in cars and drivers.
Additionally, Uber's challenge to the traditional taxi industry raises
questions about traditional taxi regulation. Much of this regulation is
conducted by state and local government, and in some American cit-
ies, regulators have complicated the operations of ride-sharing ser-
vices,143 or even prohibited them.14 4 Similarly, in Europe, Uber has
been banned in some cities. 1 4 5 As would be predicted by George Stig-
ler's classic theory of regulation, 14 6 well-organized incumbent taxi
companies have worked with captured regulators to aggressively fight
Uber and other ridesharing insurgents.1 4 7 Concentrated economic in-
terests-in this case incumbent taxi companies-lobby regulators to
use state power to maintain entry barriers and artificial scarcity that
139. See generally id. at 297-99 (noting cost efficiencies of Uber).
140. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government
Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIo ST. L.J. 901,
917 (2015); see also April Rinne, How Shareable Is Your City?, COLLABORATIVE
CONsumPTION (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.collaborativeconsumption.com/2013/10/25/
how-shareable-is-your-city [https://perma.cc/7EPT-DP38] (observing that "[wie think
nothing of cars that sit idle 23 hours a day"); Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax
Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 69, 80-81 (2015) (citing data showing that "[t]he vast majority of Ameri-
can commuters get to work by driving in a car, alone" and that the availability of "car
sharing reduces total vehicle ownership").
141. Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 140, at 917.
142. Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. 2 (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/
LD4D-JGGQ] ("[N]early two-thirds of Americans own a smartphone.").
143. See Christopher Bonanos, Hail Storm, N.Y. (July 31, 2014), http://nymag.com/
news/features/taxis-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/2H9G-FARP] (noting that New York has
required taxi licenses for Lyft to operate).
144. E.g., Maryclaire Dale, Uber Gets OK for Much of Pennsylvania, Not Philly,
CNS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/uber-gets-
ok-much-pennsylvania-not-philly [https://perma.cc/BX5C-ZXS6] (reporting that
Pennsylvania's Public Utility Commission, though considering a ban, allowed UberX
to operate on a conditional basis throughout most of the state-but that drivers in
Philadelphia were subject to fines).
145. E.g., Jeevan Vasagar, Uber Taxi Service Suffers Setback in Berlin, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2014, 10:19 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/1591faf2-c638-11e3-ba0e-00144
feabdcO#axzz387TxWRMa.
146. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGT. Sci. 3, 5 (1971) ("[E]very industry or occupation that has enough political
power to utilize the state will seek to control entry [and] to retard the rate of growth
of new firms.").
147. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 140, at 904, 927.
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ultimately hurts consumers.1 4 8 In Philadelphia, evidence has emerged
that the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA), a local government
agency that regulates taxicabs in addition to parking, has hired its own
lobbyists to influence the state legislature not to legalize Uber in the
city, while simultaneously organizing taxi companies to run under-
cover stings on Uber drivers and reporting them to police, in large
part to preserve the value of the taxi licenses (medallions) from which
the PPA generates revenue.14 9 Remarkably, the PPA has justified this
action based on a sense of "fairness" to licensees (medallion holders).
Unfortunately for believers in the underlying rationale for antitrust
law, the PPA does not seem to have weighed the possibility that con-
sumer welfare might outweigh taxi companies' cost recovery and the
impact to the PPA's own revenue.so
But regulatory responses such as those shown in the Uber example
could have repercussions beyond reductions in supply and the genera-
tion of cartel rents in a static sense. Specifically, the potential for in-
cumbents to influence the use of state power to "anti-disrupt" firms
that drive down cost through technological change could cause real
harms to dynamic growth and innovation. While Uber and Airbnb'5 s
have managed to create successful businesses despite their challenges
to incumbent taxi companies and hoteliers, respectively, they have
faced state-powered anti-disruption. And analogous to post-Napster
IP rights holders, the next set of incumbents will be further fore-
warned and might be better forearmed against disruptive insur-
gents.1 52 In short, while the overall relationship between government
and innovation is beneficial, incumbent-protecting application of ex-
isting regulation to thwart technology-driven cost reductions seems in-
arguably bad for consumers.1 53
148. Emily Badger, The Taxi Industry Is Crushing Uber and Lyft on the Lobbying
Front, 3,500 to 1, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 31, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/31/the-taxi-industry-is-crushing-uber-and-lyft-on-the
-lobbying-front-3500-to-1 [https://perma.cc/F39N-8TWY].
149. William Bender, Emails: Parking Authority Worked with Taxis to Stop Uber,
PHILLY.COM (Jan. 29, 2016), http://articles.philly.com/2016-01-29/news/70154082 1
uberx-ppa-taxi-industry [https://perma.cc/XY9D-KDHE] (reporting that "emails ob-
tained by the Daily News" show that the parking authority, which has "[an inherent
conflict of interest" as it "collects millions of dollars a year in taxicab-related fees"
and license (medallion) sales, "teamed with the taxi industry it regulates in an effort
to ensure that ride-sharing services remain illegal in Philadelphia").
150. See Vince Fenerty, Safety, Fairness Drive PPA Ride-Share Concerns,
PHILLY.COM: THINK TANK (Feb. 1, 2016, 1:37 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/
thinktank/Safety-fairness-drive-PPA-ride-share-concerns.html [https://perma.cc/
JW8D-BYX2] (head of PPA writing that its actions vis-A-vis Uber and its competitors
are driven in part by the need for "fair competition" and the "interests of all impacted
parties").
151. See Winkler & MacMillan, supra note 38.
152. See generally Desai & Magliocca, supra note 11 (describing the effects of digi-
tization and noting multiple industries that have already been affected).
153. See Sofia Ranchordis, Innovation Experimentalism in the Age of the Sharing
Economy, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 871 (2015) (describing the argument that state
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In sum, the example of Uber shows how disruptive technology can
reduce costs, creating efficiencies that can improve social welfare, but
also how state power can be used to aid incumbents. Critically, these
anticompetitive actions not only create an artificial scarcity that in-
jures consumer welfare in a static sense, but also reduce the incentives
for insurgents to generate dynamic changes in the future by entering
markets and driving down fixed and marginal costs. This kind of state-
sponsored anti-disruption inhibits the process by which a post-scarcity
society might arrive. As a result, the United States will have to imple-
ment competition law and policy that addresses both effects on inno-
vation and the use of state power. Neither will be easy.
B. Artificial Scarcity and the State
As discussed previously, IP scholars have been the "first movers" in
addressing the implications of a post-scarcity society. Their analyses
have been driven in part by IP's recent experience with disruptive in-
novation-driven cost reductions-most notably with Napster and mu-
sic file sharing.'5 4 But IP scholars have also had to reconsider
intellectual-property law's use of state power to enforce artificial scar-
city. As these scholars have recognized, if innovation, production, and
distribution of IP do not require the same degree of artificial scarcity
as an incentive in the future, then such use of state power begins to
look more like an abuse of the citizenry. 5 5
With this concern for potential unjustified, state-enforced artificial
scarcity, antitrust should also reconsider its role. And indeed, antitrust
should address attempts to use IP to maintain scarcity in a post-scar-
city world. Such a role will be one that American antitrust law has
often sought to avoid-though competition law elsewhere has devel-
oped to more actively address anticompetitive restraints stemming
from the power of the state. Additionally, and less controversially, an-
titrust's role in a post-scarcity world may involve a much stronger
commitment to competition advocacy-that is, speaking up for the
values of competitive markets and voicing critiques of state actions
that injure consumer welfare.' 56 In particular, American antitrust en-
forcers may need to be more aggressive in holding IP- or innovation-
based regulation and rationales to more rigorous mean-ends tests. But
there is also lower-hanging fruit: regulation aside from IP law can be
used to maintain artificial scarcity long after the incentive goals of ex-
isting IP law have been satisfied, as can be seen from the Uber exam-
regulation tends to inhibit sharing-economy innovations that threaten traditional
incumbents).
154. See generally Desai & Magliocca, supra note 11 (describing disruptive innova-
tion's effect on multiple industries, including the music-distribution industry).
155. See supra Section II.B (discussing this scholarship).
156. See Lemley, supra note 11 (questioning the role of IP as a competition stiffer
in post-scarcity world).
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ple and has recently been seen in connection with the generic drug
Daraprim, in which FDA trial regulations create exploitable market
power, with harmful effects on consumer welfare.
However, concern about state-powered artificial scarcity goes be-
yond not only IP law; it also goes beyond the traditional objects of IP.
In fact, state power and regulation can be used to create scarcity for
other goods and services."5 s Indeed, the use of sovereign authority to
do so animated some of the earliest competition laws-law has long
recognized that the use of state power to artificially generate scarcity
is particularly harmful. 59
Harking back to the Williamson model discussed supra in Section
III.A, when a monopolist or an oligopoly lobbies the state to help
increase producers' market power, the losses are greater than simply
the deadweight loss triangle familiar to economics students. Addition-
ally, profit-maximizing firms should be willing to spend some of their
supracompetitive profit to induce the state to help the firms acquire or
retain market power; taking into account this political-economic real-
ity, the offsetting gain in the Williamson model is thus overstated.16 0
As a result, state-fostered artificial scarcity may require American
antitrust law to become more like competition law in other parts of
the world. In some of the largest world economies, such as those of
China and the EU, the competition-law regime explicitly and actively
regulates the use of state power in anticompetitive ways. 1 61 By con-
trast, American antitrust law contains broad judge-made exceptions
that greatly narrow its ability to deal with state power.16 2 The move
towards post-scarcity conditions plus the increasing incentive for in-
cumbents to lobby for state-powered artificial scarcity may require an-
titrust law to reconsider and to reach government anticompetitive
action more broadly. This will be a difficult challenge, but not one
without precedent, fortunately.
157. See Andrew Pollack, Big Price Increase for Tuberculosis Drug Is Rescinded,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/big-price-in
crease-for-tb-drug-is-rescinded.html (discussing how a large U.S. price hike for
Daraprim, a drug manufactured by a single U.S. company, could easily be undercut by
imports from countries where it is made and sold much more cheaply, but for the
regulatory burden that makes such importation infeasible).
158. See supra Section IV.A.
159. See, e.g., Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3 (Eng.), http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/aep/Jal/21/3 [https://perma.cc/NSL8-JCZT].
160. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 94, at § 12.2b.
161. See Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsid-
ering China's Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 416-23 (2009) (discussing
the competition-law approach to anticompetitive state action in China and the EU).
162. See Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional
and Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 521, 545-46 (2005) (describing judicial
deference to states under antitrust immunity based on federalism concerns).
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C. Prescriptions
Despite-or arguably because of-a general political atmosphere
that leans towards free-market economics, American antitrust law
currently takes a "hands off" approach towards state interference with
markets. 1 6 3 Given this tendency, together with a lack of judicial expe-
rience with a post-scarcity economy, any policy proposals must be
somewhat tentative. Nonetheless, there are two ways in which Ameri-
can antitrust can evolve that may reduce attempts at state-driven arti-
ficial scarcity that do not involve drastic changes with potentially
major unforeseen consequences.
First, courts should move towards more substantive review of eco-
nomic regulation. Notably, the federal courts of appeal are currently
split with respect to whether "naked economic protectionism" is justi-
fication enough to satisfy rational-basis review,1.6 4 and this has led to a
robust scholarly debate on the question.1 65 While a full treatment of
this discussion is beyond the scope of an antitrust-focused article, the
considerations discussed previously about the transition to a post-scar-
city economy counsel that, all things being equal, this question should
be answered in the negative. Moving the review of "naked economic
protectionism" in this direction may be particularly important since,
as production costs fall towards zero, the relative benefits of investing
in attempts to drive fixed or marginal costs down will start to pale in
comparison to investments in lobbying to garner favorable artificial-
scarcity creating regulation.
Additionally, and more broadly, the realization of a post-scarcity
society may require a high degree of competition advocacy. In particu-
163. See FED. TRADE COMM'N OFF. POL'Y PLAN., REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION
TASK FORCE (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy-docu
ments/report-state-action-task-force/stateactionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP2Q-
MXN3] (thoroughly reviewing state-action cases and concluding that courts' unsettled
and expansive reading of antitrust immunity for state action had undeservingly
shielded substantial anticompetitive conduct).
164. Compare St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013)
(striking down exercise of state power based on naked economic protectionism), and
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (same), with Sensational Smiles,
LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 284-86 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding exercise of state power
based on naked economic protectionism), and Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225
(10th Cir. 2004) (same).
165. See Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic
Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1055 (2014) (approving of the appearance of "rational
basis with bite" in lower courts, in which they invalidate acts of naked economic pro-
tectionism); Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MicH. L. REV. 1479, 1495 (2008)
(suggesting that the Court's approach to rational-basis review in Lawrence v. Texas
was a departure from the norm that could be applied in the future to create a "pre-
sumption of liberty" usable in economic-liberty cases); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Pref-
erences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1695-96 (1984) (advocating a
more tolerant approach towards naked economic protectionism); see also Aaron Ed-
lin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014) (considering what amounts to
naked protectionism for licensed occupations and the relevant antitrust implications).
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lar, antitrust agencies should adopt stronger policies of speech and dis-
cussion regarding legislation and regulation that may tend to thwart
cost-reducing disruptive technology. This is particularly important for
those technologies-such as Internet-based mass collaboration-that
do not have built-in advocates in the form of IP rightsholder political
lobbies. The federal antitrust agencies are well placed to do this advo-
cacy; they possess institutional strengths such as economic and indus-
try knowledge, and they also have developed a reputation for
technocracy that buffers them to a degree from political interfer-
ence.1 6 6 Much as federal authority guides and creates norms for local
policy in law enforcement, education, and other areas, it may also do
so regarding local economic regulation that creates artificial scar-
city.16 7 Furthermore, some attempts at warning that include an ap-
praisal of regulatory costs-in the manner of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for example-may be
particularly useful in making competition advocacy in this regard
more digestible for legislators, regulators, stakeholders, and the public
at large.1 68
V. CONCLUSION
Cast ye up, cast ye up, prepare the way, take up the stumblingblock
out of the way of my people.1 69
The idea of a post-scarcity economy may sound a bit Panglossian,
and competition law might not be the first thing most would associate
with a potential material paradise on Earth. Admittedly, such a soci-
ety would involve more changes, and probably more legal changes,
than competition law reforms. As other commentators have noted, 170
areas of law such as copyright and patent might also require signifi-
cant change. Indeed, the nature of a post-scarcity society might raise
questions about whether such legal regimes would increasingly be
used to maintain artificial scarcity rather than encourage technological
progress. Still, as this Article has argued, the real challenge of techno-
166. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159 (2008) (dis-
cussing development and policy shifts leading to the development of a technocracy in
antitrust enforcement).
167. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att'y's Office, N. Dist. Cal., Fed., State and Local
Officials Band Together to Combat Bullying (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
archive/usao/can/news/2012/2012_09_14_stopbullyingsummit.press.html [https://
perma.cc/UM5J-YPVT] (discussing DOJ Civil Rights Division initiative guiding local
government in an area involving both law enforcement and education).
168. See John M. Broder, Powerful Shaper of U.S. Rules Quits, with Critics in Wake,
N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/science/earth/cass-sun
stein-to-leave-top-regulatory-post.html (describing OIRA's role in providing regula-
tory burden cost-benefit analysis regarding acts of federal government).
169. Isaiah 57:14 (King James).
170. See Lemley, supra note 11; Desai & Magliocca, supra note 11; Beebe, supra
note 18.
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logical abundance may be the transition away from a traditional econ-
omy. Competition law for a post-scarcity society requires activity in
the near term to counteract both private and state anti-disruption; it
will fall on competition law to oppose forces that would prevent such
a world from being realized. As this Article has discussed, under the
standard cost-benefit rubric under which antitrust law has been ana-
lyzed for the past several decades, a revitalized antitrust law seems a
small price to pay to transition to a world where marginal and fixed
costs approach zero, and material needs are largely met. Keynes's
dream 71 is worth some reevaluation and re-energization of antitrust
law.
171. See KEYNES, supra note 19.

